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I.

Background

[Corporate Taxpayer] and Affiliates1 (collectively, the “Taxpayers”) appeal from an
assessment of corporate income tax made by Maine Revenue Services (“MRS”) for tax years
[one] through [three].2 An Appeals Conference was held on [date], at which the Taxpayers were
represented by [Taxpayer Representatives], with MRS represented by [MRS Representatives].
Appeals Officer [ ] presided.
The issue presented on appeal is whether, as MRS contends, certain business activities
conducted by independent contractors on behalf of the Taxpayers exceeded protections afforded
by federal law under P.L. 86-272 (15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84), which allows a nonresident seller of
tangible personal property to solicit orders for sales in a given state without subjecting itself to
the income tax jurisdiction of that state. These activities at issue, according to MRS, subjected
the Taxpayers to liability for Maine income tax. The Taxpayers have the burden of proof to
show that it is more likely than not that MRS erred in making the assessment. 36 M.R.S. § 151D(10)(F).
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[Footnote omitted].
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[Footnote omitted].
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II.

Facts

At all relevant times, the Taxpayers were producers and distributers of tangible personal
property for sale in Maine and elsewhere. The Taxpayers had no real estate or tangible personal
property located in Maine and, with one exception not at issue here, had no employees in Maine
during the period at issue. The Taxpayers employed independent brokers (hereinafter “Brokers”)
to solicit orders for sales that would then be sent out of Maine for approval and fulfillment. The
Brokers performed other tasks for the Taxpayers, all of which arguably increased the sales of the
Taxpayers’ products.
Every 2-4 weeks, [Broker employees] visited each assigned retail location where the
Taxpayers’ products were sold, and used handheld devices to scan and enter information about
the display of the Taxpayers’ products. The types of information gathered by [the Brokers]
included the amounts of the Taxpayers’ products displayed for sale, whether and how the
products were displayed, and whether any remedial action was needed or taken. [The Brokers]
compiled the information from the handheld devices and provided it to the Taxpayers.
According to statements made by [a Broker’s] supervisor, both during the audit and at the
Appeals Conference, [Broker employees were] the “eyes and ears” of the Taxpayers in the State
of Maine.
[Early in the audit period, Broker employees used the handheld devices to record and
report whether one of the Taxpayers’ products had lost shelf space to a competitor’s product. The
Broker’s employees also gathered and reported information regarding the display of the products
of Taxpayers’ competitors. Later in the audit period, again using the handheld devices, Broker
employees reported whether Taxpayers’ products, displayed for sale on retailers’ shelves, were
observably defective. Later, the Broker’s employees corrected certain significant visible defects
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in Taxpayers’ products located on the shelves.] [Broker] employees also gathered and reported
marketing information regarding [one of] Taxpayers’ competitor[s] . . . in all three tax years—
including pricing information in [years two and three].
[Broker employees] also affixed coupons and tags containing information and/or coupons
to the Taxpayers’ products on the retailers’ shelves in order to promote merchandise turnover.
[The Brokers] offered product display suggestions to the retailers in order to increase sales and,
to a lesser extent, alerted the retailers when the Taxpayers’ products were damaged, defective,
expired, or out-of-stock on store shelves. The Brokers also advocated with retailers regarding
shelf placement, positioning, and display of the Taxpayers’ products. In the case of a retailer
that utilized planograms—diagrams showing shelf placement of products—the results of the
Brokers’ advocacy were committed to writing and made subject to further monitoring by the
Brokers. [The Brokers] were compensated for their services by the Taxpayers on a sales
commission basis.
....
The Taxpayers’ [year one] Maine return reflected an alleged overpayment . . . of
[amount] because, as computed by them, their estimated payments had exceeded their Maine
income tax liability by that amount. On that return, the Taxpayers requested that the alleged
overpayment be applied to their [year two] Maine income tax liability. The Taxpayers
subsequently filed a [year two] Maine return showing no income tax liability, and requested a
refund of [amount], which is the amount of the overpayment carried over from [year one] plus an
additional estimated tax overpayment of [amount] that they paid for [year two]. The Taxpayers
also subsequently filed a Maine income tax return for [year three] showing no payments and no
liability for that tax year.
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Maine Revenue Services (“MRS”) conducted a nexus audit of the Taxpayers and
determined that, due to their activities in Maine, each of the affiliated companies had Maine
income tax nexus and was liable for Maine income tax. . . . On th[is] bas[is], MRS issued the
subject assessment . . . for tax of [amount], interest of [amount], and substantial understatement
penalties of [amount], a total of [amount]. Because the [year one] period was beyond the 3-year
statute of limitation provided by 36 M.R.S. § 141(1), MRS made the assessment for that year
relying on section 141(2)(A), which extends the time within which an assessment may be made
to “6 years from the date the return was filed if the tax liability shown on the return . . . is less
than 1/2 of the tax liability determined by the assessor.”
The Taxpayers argue that all activities conducted on their behalf in Maine consisted of
solicitations of orders for sales to be approved and filled outside of Maine. Thus, according to
the Taxpayers, no activities were conducted on their behalf outside the protections contained in
P.L. 86-272 to establish Maine income tax nexus for the subject period. The Taxpayers therefore
contend that the assessment must be vacated.
III.

Law

Annually, a tax is imposed on the Maine net income of “each taxable corporation and [of]
each group of corporations that derive income from a unitary business carried on by two or more
members of an affiliated group.” 36 M.R.S. § 5200(1). In relevant part, for any corporate
taxpayer, the term “Maine net income” means
the taxable income of that taxpayer for that taxable year under the laws of the
United States as modified by section 5200-A and apportionable to this State under
[36 M.R.S. §§ 5210-12]. To the extent that it derives from a unitary business
carried on by 2 or more members of an affiliated group, the Maine net income of
a corporation is determined by apportioning that part of the federal taxable
income of the entire group that derives from the unitary business.
36 M.R.S.A. § 5102(8).
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Under Maine tax law, the State Tax Assessor may make an assessment “within 3 years
from the date the return was filed or 3 years from the date the return was required to be filed,
whichever is later,” except
[a]n assessment may be made within 6 years from the date the return was filed if
the tax liability shown on the return, after adjustments necessary to correct any
mathematical errors apparent on the face of the return, is less than 1/2 of the tax
liability determined by the assessor. In determining whether the 50% threshold
provided by this paragraph is satisfied, the assessor may not consider any portion
of the understated tax liability for which the taxpayer has substantial authority
supporting its position.
36 M.R.S. § 141(2)(A). After issuing an assessment, the Assessor must waive or abate penalties
for “reasonable cause,” on any of the grounds enumerated in 36 M.R.S.A. § 187-B(7), including
when “[t]he taxpayer has supplied substantial authority justifying the failure to file or pay” the
tax owed. 36 M.R.S.A. § 187-B(7)(F).
Limiting Maine’s ability to subject corporations to tax, however, is Public Law 86-272
(“P.L. 86-272”) (15 U.S.C. §§ 381-843). This federal statute prohibits a state from imposing
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15 U.S.C. §381. Imposition of net income tax

(a) Minimum standards
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any taxable year ending after September
14, 1959, a net income tax on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if the
only business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or both,
of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for sales of tangible
personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if
approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in the name of or for
the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by such customer to such person to
enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders described in
paragraph (1).
(b) Domestic corporations; persons domiciled in or residents of a State
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the imposition of a net income tax by any State, or
political subdivision thereof, with respect to(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of such State; or
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is domiciled in, or a resident of, such State.
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income tax on a taxpayer engaged in interstate commerce if the activities of the taxpayer within
the state constitute no more than the solicitation of orders for interstate sales of tangible personal
property, provided the orders are sent outside of the state for approval and the goods are
delivered from out of state. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a). Rather than describing activities that will
expose a taxpayer to income tax liability, P.L. 86-272 sets forth certain specific activities that do
not expose them to taxation. Among these “safe harbor” activities are sales and solicitations of
orders for sales of tangible personal property on the taxpayer’s behalf by an independent
contractor, and the maintenance of an office by such contractor in the state proposing to subject
the person to income taxation. Id. § 381(c).
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has identified certain other activities that, if
engaged in by or on behalf of a taxpayer, do not subject the taxpayer to income taxation. These
are: (1) “those activities that are entirely ancillary to requests for purchases—those that serve no
independent business function apart from their connection to the soliciting of orders—[as
opposed to] those activities that the company would have reason to engage in anyway but
chooses to allocate to its in-state sales force,” and (2) those activities that, although not
solicitation of orders, are sufficiently de minimis so as to avoid “establish[ing] a nontrivial

(c) Sales or solicitation of orders for sales by independent contractors
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be considered to have engaged in business activities
within a State during any taxable year merely by reason of sales in such State, or the solicitation of orders for sales
in such State, of tangible personal property on behalf of such person by one or more independent contractors, or by
reason of the maintenance, of an office in such State by one or more independent contractors whose activities on
behalf of such person in such State consist solely of making sales, or soliciting orders for sales, or [sic] tangible
personal property.
(d) Definitions
For purposes of this section(1) the term “independent contractor” means a commission agent, broker, or other independent
contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of, tangible personal
property for more than one principal and who holds himself out as such in the regular course of
his business activities; and
(2) the term “representative” does not include an independent contractor.
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additional connection with the taxing State.” Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley,
Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 228-29, 232 (1992).
IV.

Analysis

A. Liability for the assessed tax.
Under P.L. 86-272, a nonresident seller of tangible personal property may solicit orders
for sales of the property in Maine without establishing Maine income tax nexus, as long as the
orders are sent outside Maine for approval, and shipment or delivery is from a point outside
Maine. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a). Where the seller employs an independent contractor, the contractor
may also make sales, and may maintain an office in Maine without establishing Maine income
tax nexus for the seller. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c). In Wrigley, the United States Supreme Court
described the parameters of the protection afforded by P.L. 86-272 as follows:
Providing a car and stock of free samples to salesmen is part of the “solicitation of
orders,” because the only reason to do it is to facilitate requests for purchases.
Contrariwise, employing salesmen to repair or service the company’s products is
not part of the “solicitation of orders,” since there is good reason to get that done
whether or not the company has a sales force. Repair and servicing may help to
increase purchases; but it is not ancillary to requesting purchases, and cannot be
converted into “solicitation” by merely being assigned to salesmen.
Wrigley at 229 (emphasis in original).
Much of the activity conducted on behalf of the Taxpayers in the present case, however,
does not constitute solicitation of orders for sales.4 For example, under certain circumstances,
the examination of a retailer’s inventories is an activity protected under P.L. 86-272. See, e.g.,
18-125 C.M.R. 808 § .04(D)(9) (“checking of customers’ inventories without charge therefor
(for re-order, but not for other purposes such as quality control)” will not cause the loss of
4

P.L. 86-272 permits independent contractors to make sales—as distinguished from solicitation of orders for sales—
without establishing income tax nexus for the principal seller. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c). There is no argument or
evidence in this case, however, that the Brokers made or attempted to make sales of the Taxpayers’ products in
Maine.
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protection for otherwise protected sales that occur in the State of Maine) (emphasis added). In
the present case, however, the Taxpayers assert that the Brokers did not check retailers’
inventory levels, and that the “[Broker’s] handheld devices played no role whatsoever in
monitoring inventory.” Taxpayers’ Post-Hearing Brief dated [date] at page 4. Thus, [the
Broker’s] gathering of information on the types and quantities of products displayed and the
manner of exhibition—including whether or not competitors’ products are displayed—and
reporting that information to the Taxpayers, does not constitute checking of retailer inventory for
re-order purposes. This gathering and reporting of information did not directly stimulate orders
for sales, and the Taxpayers would have a separate business purpose for that reported
information apart from solicitation of orders, such as identifying marketing opportunities and
problems; generating and evaluating marketing actions; and assessing and monitoring marketing
performance. See Skagen Designs, Ltd. v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 8168-R, 2012 Minn. Tax
LEXIS 25 at *14 (Minn. T.C. Apr. 23, 2012) (information in photographs and reports made by
merchandisers served the independent business purpose of allowing the taxpayer to collect
valuable market data). Similarly, the observation and reporting of [defects in] a product’s
condition, such as [occurred in this case], does not directly stimulate orders for sales, yet the
information collected is of obvious quality-control value to the Taxpayers. Finally, although the
actual manipulation of products displayed on the retailers’ shelves, such as [correcting
significant visible defects in Taxpayers’] products or affixing coupons and tags to products to
make them more attractive, may actually increase sales, such actions are not ancillary to
requesting purchases. See Wrigley at 233 (a manufacturer “would wish to attend to the
replacement of spoiled product whether or not it employed a sales force”); see also Kennametal,
Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 686 N.E.2d 436, 441 (Mass. 1997) (seller not protected under P.L.
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86-272 where activities served independent business purposes in addition to solicitation of orders
for sales). Certainly, the Taxpayers had good reason to resolve the [visible defects in their]
products whether or not they had a sales force; common sense dictates that a purchaser is less
likely to purchase an abnormal-appearing product, all other factors being equal. The Taxpayers
also had good reason to stimulate sales of products already on retailers’ shelves by affixing
coupons and tags to the products, but this is not the same activity as soliciting orders for sales,
and it serves a separate economic function, i.e., to increase the retailers’ sales of those products.
To qualify for P.L. 86-272 protection, however, “the activities must facilitate the actual
solicitation of orders; they may not merely serve to increase general sales.” Kennametal at 441
(citing Wrigley at 233).5 Such activities cannot be converted into “solicitation” by merely being
assigned to salesmen.6
Alternatively, the Taxpayers argue that any activity engaged in by the Brokers that does
not fit squarely within the safe harbor of P.L. 86-272 or that is not entirely ancillary to
solicitation of orders for sale as allowed under Wrigley is de minimis in nature and insufficient to
bring the Taxpayers within the nexus jurisdiction of the State of Maine. The Wrigley court did
recognize a de minimis exception to the strict application of P.L. 86-272, noting
“the venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex (“the law cares not for trifles”) is
part of the established background of legal principles against which all
enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are
deemed to accept.
Wrigley at 231.
5

The manipulation of products on retailers’ shelves in this case does not invoke protection under 15 U.S.C. § 381
(a)(2). That provision allows a seller or representative to solicit a retailer’s customers for orders, which orders are
then sent outside the state by the retailer for approval and fulfillment. These have been referred to as “missionary”
requests. Wrigley at 233. Similarly, because the manipulation of products on retailers’ shelves serves the separate
business purpose of increasing general sales, the manipulation is not an activity that is protected by P.L. 86-272 as
“entirely ancillary” to sales by an independent contractor.
6

[Footnote omitted].
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In Wrigley itself, for example, the taxpayer was engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling chewing gum. The taxpayer’s sales representatives made unprotected sales of gum in
Wisconsin through “agency stock checks”7 (approximately 0.00007% of its in-state sales—seven
one-hundred thousandths of one percent (several hundred dollars per year)) and maintained a
stock of chewing gum in Wisconsin worth several thousand dollars for the purpose of
exchanging that stock for stale gum held by retailers. Although the relative magnitude of those
activities was not large when compared to Wrigley’s other operations in Wisconsin, the court
concluded that the activities were not de minimis but constituted a “nontrivial additional
connection” with that state. Wrigley at 235 (stating “[w]e need not decide whether any of the
nonimmune activities was de minimis in isolation; taken together, they clearly are not.”). See
also Skagen at 20 (“we must decide if [the non-immune activities] were de minimis when taken
together”) and Kennametal at 440 n. 5 (“To qualify for a de minimis exception, a court must
consider the activities of the taxpayer within the State as a whole.”).
Similarly, in Peterson v. State Tax Assessor, 1999 ME 23, 724 A.2d 610, the taxpayer, a
New Hampshire partnership, was engaged in the business of selling dental supplies. MRS
determined that the taxpayer had income tax nexus with the State of Maine and issued an
assessment on that basis. The activities engaged in by the taxpayer in Peterson included
delivering items in Maine, picking up items from Maine customers, and accepting payment from
customers in Maine, all of which did not constitute solicitation of orders. Peterson ¶ 11. The
Law Court found that these activities were not de minimis when viewed in the aggregate because

7

The term “agency stock check” is not defined. The term appears in Wrigley in the following context:
The representative would issue an “agency stock check” to the retailer, indicating the quantity
supplied; he would send a copy of this to the Chicago office or to the wholesaler, and the retailer
would ultimately be billed (by the wholesaler) in the proper amount.

Wrigley at 218.
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they occurred regularly and consistently over the audit period, thereby establishing a “nontrivial
additional connection” with the State of Maine. Id. (quoting Wrigley at 232). See also Wrigley
at 235 (activities were not de minimis where conducted on a continuing basis as a matter of
regular company policy); Skagen at 20 (merchandisers’ activities of generating and submitting
weekly reports and monthly photographs, combined with their submission of floor maps and
conducting training presentations, were not de minimis).
In the present case, the activities engaged in by the Brokers [. . .] of monitoring and
reporting the amounts of the Taxpayers’ products displayed, the manner of display, and whether
remedial action was needed or taken, occurred with regularity throughout the entire period at
issue. Although some activities, such as inspecting the Taxpayers’ products for defects and
gathering competitor pricing and marketing information, occurred infrequently, other activities,
such as affixing coupons and tags directly on products to improve salability, were performed
more often.8 In and of themselves, these activities are not solicitation of orders under P.L. 86272 and are not entirely ancillary thereto. When viewed in the aggregate, the activities establish
a “nontrivial additional connection” of the Taxpayers with the State of Maine. The activities are
not de minimis. No adjustment to the assessment is warranted on this basis.
B. Penalties
As part of their argument, the Taxpayers also contend that the penalties assessed against
them should be waived or abated pursuant to 36 M.R.S. § 187-B(7). As mentioned above, this
statute provides that the Assessor “shall waive or abate” any penalty if the taxpayer supplies
“reasonable cause” for doing so. One of the enumerated examples of “reasonable cause” is

8

The frequency with which [Broker] representatives engaged in certain activities during the period at issue is
detailed in a spreadsheet containing [thousands of] lines of data, consisting of questions, instructions, and responses
sent to and from the [Broker’s] handheld devices.
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“substantial authority justifying the failure to file or pay.” 36 M.R.S. § 187-B(7)(F). Substantial
authority, in turn, may consist of a well-reasoned construction of the statute at issue, in this case
P.L. 86-272. See Treas. Reg. § 16662-4(d)(3) (cited by John Swenson Granite, Inc. v. State Tax
Assessor, 685 A.2d 425, 429 n.3 (Me. 1996)).
Here, although we find that the Taxpayers did engage in activities that are not protected
by P.L. 86-272, we also find that the line between the activities engaged in by the Taxpayers and
those protected under P.L. 86-272 is not so clear that the Taxpayers did not have substantial
authority for their filing position, even though that position was erroneous. The line between
activities that are protected by that statute and those that are not can be difficult to discern. As
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in Kennametal, “[t]here exists no bright line
to distinguish those activities that are entirely ancillary to the solicitation of orders from those
that also serve an independent business function.” Kennametal at 441. Although some guidance
on this issue is available, such as MRS’s Rule 808 on corporate income tax nexus, in many
situations these materials do not make this line easier to draw. Additionally, the only ruling of
which the Board is aware concerning the use of independent contractors to perform activities
argued to be protected under 86-272 was decided after the due date and filing of the Taxpayers’
returns in this case. See Ann Sacks Tile and Stone, Inc., v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2011 Ore. Tax
LEXIS 403, ¶ 16 (holding that “activities by independent contractors conducted for a taxpayer
but beyond those set out in the statute lead to a taxpayer losing the protection of Pub L No 86272.”).
With this in mind, we find that the Taxpayers had substantial authority at the time they
filed their Maine returns for their position that they did not have Maine income tax nexus, even
though that position was incorrect. In particular, we note that the Taxpayers’ construction of 86-
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272 as protecting many of the activities performed on their behalf in Maine by their brokers as
being solicitation, ancillary to solicitation, or de minimis in nature is sufficiently well-reasoned to
constitute substantial authority. Accordingly, we abate the substantial understatement penalties
contained in the assessment regarding tax years [two] and [three]. Also, on the same basis as set
forth above, this finding of substantial authority dictates that the extended statute of limitation
under 36 M.R.S. § 141(2)(A) is not applicable here, and that the assessment for tax year [one] is
cancelled in full as beyond the limitation set forth in section 141(1).9
C. Interest
Finally, the Taxpayers contend that they are entitled to the waiver or abatement of
interest pursuant to 36 M.R.S.A. § 186. Unlike the penalty waiver provisions in section 187B(7), however, section 186 “confers broad discretion on the [A]ssessor because it does not
require a waiver or abatement of interest upon a showing of reasonable cause.” Victor Bravo
Aviation, LLC v. State Tax Assessor, 2012 ME 32 ¶ 10, 39 A.3d 65. Instead, under section 186,
the Assessor “may abate or waive the payment” of interest “[i]f the failure to pay a tax when
required is explained to the satisfaction of the assessor.” 36 M.R.S. § 186 (emphasis added).
This language “indicates a highly discretionary standard that is not easily met by the taxpayer.”
Victor Bravo Aviation, LLC, 2012 ME 32 ¶ 14, 39 A.3d 65. Thus, grounds or authority that may
provide “reasonable cause” warranting the waiver or abatement of penalties under section 187-B
do not “ipso facto” provide a satisfactory explanation for the waiver or abatement of interest. Id.
This higher standard serves to:

9

The Taxpayers also argued that the penalties contained in the assessment must be abated on the ground that “MRS
failed to provide notice to the industry that it would be systematically targeting out-of-state [producers and
distributors of tangible person property] and denying them the protection under P.L. 86-272 if they used local
brokers to conduct their sales activities in Maine.” The evidence presented does not support the Taxpayers’ claim.
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support[] the reasonable purpose of most statutory and contractual interest
payment requirements to assure that the investment value of money inures to the
benefit of the party that should have been paid the money when the payment
obligation arose. Id.
Here, we find that although the Taxpayers presented reasonable cause for the waiver of penalties,
those grounds do not meet the higher standard of constituting a satisfactory explanation of the
Taxpayers’ failure to pay the tax at issue such that interest should be waived and the State lose
the investment value of the tax. We therefore uphold the assessment of interest for the [year
two] and [year three] tax years.
V.

DECISION

Insufficient evidence has been presented to show that the Taxpayers are not liable for the
tax amounts contained in the assessment, and the Taxpayers have not established a basis for
abatement of interest. However, the Taxpayers had substantial authority for their treatment of
the tax at the time they filed their returns. Accordingly, the substantial understatement penalties
for [year two] and [year three] are abated in full. The assessment for [year one] is cancelled in
full as beyond the statute of limitation for assessment. No further relief is warranted on the facts
presented.
The Board may, in limited circumstances, reconsider its decision on any appeal. If either
party wishes to request reconsideration, that party must file a written request with the Board
within 20 days of receiving this decision. Contact the Appeals Office at 207-287-2864 or see the
Board’s rules, available at http://www.maine.gov/boardoftaxappeals/lawsrules/, for more
information on when the Board may grant reconsideration. If no motion for reconsideration is
filed within 20 days of the date of this proposed decision, it will become the Board’s final
administrative action. If either party wishes to appeal the Board’s decision in this matter to the
Maine Superior Court, that party must do so within 60 days of receiving this decision. During
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the 60-day period in which an appeal may be filed with the Superior Court, the Taxpayers may
contact Maine Revenue Services at 207-624-9725 for the amount of tax that is currently due,
together with any interest or penalties owed. After that 60-day period has expired, Maine
Revenue Services will contact the Taxpayers with an updated amount of tax and any interest or
penalties due at that time.

Issued by the Board: April 2, 2014

DISSENT by Board Member [Name].
I respectfully dissent from the decision reached by the Board and would instead cancel
the entire assessment of tax, interest, and penalties at issue here. I find that the activities the
Taxpayers’ Brokers performed in Maine on behalf of the Taxpayers constituted solicitation, were
ancillary to solicitation or were de minimis in nature, and thus protected by P.L. 86-272 as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wrigley. This is especially true when the facts of this
case are viewed in the context of today’s highly competitive retail sales industry.

Dissent issued: April 2, 2014
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